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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. L. 'VILLIAMS & SONS, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ANTHON E. BRO,VN and 
LUCILLE BRO,VN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10518 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, a Utah corporation, appeals from 
the decision of the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, 
District Judge, granting the respondents judgment 
on their counterclaim against the appellant in the sum 
of $2,000 because of the alleged interference by the 
appellant with an easement of the respondent. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant A. L. \Villiams & Sons, a Utah 
corporation, filed suit against the defendants alleging 
that the defendants breached a lease whereby the de-
fendants leased certain property in a shopping center 
in Roy, Utah from the appellant. The appellant sought 
damages for breach of the lease. The respondents 
answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim alleg· 
ing that the appellant constructed buildings on a right 
of way of the respondents. Thereafter an amended 
answer and counterclaim was filed by the respondents · 
seeking removal of the buildings from the right of way 
and actual damages in the sum of $7 ,882 and $5,000 
punitive damages. The matter was tried before the • 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, sitting 1 
without jury, on September 28, 1965. The court con· 
eluded that the appellant should recover from the 
respondents, based upon the appellant's claim of breach 
of the lease. The court, however, awarded judgment 
to the respondents on their counterclaim in the amount 
of $3,000 which when offset against the judgment 
rendered in favor of the appellant resulted in a final 
judgment being entered in favor of the respondents 
and against the appellant in the sum of $2,000. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant submits that the judgment in favor 
of the respondents should be reversed and that the lower 
court should be directed to enter judgment in favor 
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of the appellant on its lease claim and dismiss the 
judgment for the respondents based on their counter-
claim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant filed complaint June 24th, 1964, 
against the respondents alleging that on June 1st, 
1962, a lease was entered into between the parties for 
certain space at a shopping center in Roy, Utah. The 
lease was to run until July 1st, 1964 ( R-1) . It was 
further alleged that the respondents vacated the prem-
ises when there were eight months due on the term 
of the lease and that as a consequence, appellant was 
entitled to damages for the breach of the lease. An 
answer and counterclaim were filed (R-3). The per-
tinent part of the pleadings so far as this appeal is 
concerned is the counterclaim of the respondents. No 
cross-appeal has been taken from the decision of the 
trial court awarding the appellant judgment against 
the respondents on the claim of breach of the lease. 
The counterclaim alleged that the respondents 
were owners of a right of way for the perpetual use 
in common with others of certain property near the 
shopping center, which right of way included "service 
drives, sidewalks and parking areas now or hereinafter 
constructed" on the described property (R-3, p. 2). 
The respondents claimed $7,882 actual damages be-
cause of the construction of buildings by appellant upon 
the claimed right of way (R-10). 
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At the time of trial, the deposition of Anthony 
E. Brown was received and published. :Mr. Brown 
indicated that he owned certain ground in a shopping 
center in Roy, Utah which is the subject of the con-
troversy between the parties ( DT-9) . ( 1) He indicated 
that he purchased the property in 1959 from Mr. Nor-
man Thompson (DT-9). It further appeared that the 
appellant had erected a building on the east end of 
the shopping center on the parking right of way claimed 
by the respondents (DT-10). It appeared that Mr. 
Brown was aware of the construction, and at one time 
had caused his attorney to write a letter in opposition 
to the construction (DT-11). The letter was received 
into evidence as defendants' Exhibit 5. Further, the 
letter indicates that A. L. Williams & Sons was ap-
parently contemplating the construction of a dry 
cleaning unit in the Roy Shopping Center, and it was 
claimed by the respondents, through counsel, that the 
construction of the dry cleaning establishment would 
interfere with the tenants of the respondents who had 
leased respondents' property in the shopping center 
1 
for a dry cleaning establishment and launderette. The 
letter also pointed out to the appellant that Mr. Brown 
claimed a right of way in the shopping center area 
where the construction was contemplated for the use 
of parking or similar services. However, it did not 1 
affirmatively object to the construction on the property, 
but merely indicated that it was Mr. Brown's position 
(1) The transcript at trial is cited (T). The deposition of Mr. 
Brown is cited (DT). 
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that no structure should be erected in the area unless 
he consented to it. The letter finally indicated that 
rnunsel for the respondents was of the opinion that 
the matter could be amicably worked out among the 
parties (Defendants' Exhibit 5). The area where the 
eonstruction occurred was at the east end of the Roy 
Shopping Center in a space 92.8 feet in width (De-
fendants' Exhibit I; Plaintiff's Exhibit F; Defendants' 
Exhibit 6). Prior to the construction, there was a 
Standard Service Station on the northeast end of the 
shopping center and the space of 92.8 feet between 
the service station and additional shopping center build-
ings. The effect of the construction was to completely 
close the front of the shopping center area as is indi-
cated in defendants' Exhibit 6. It also effected a 30 
foot driveway in the rear of the buildings by prevent-
ing exit through the 92.8 foot space, but left a 16 foot 
easement leading onto 1900 West Street from the 30 
foot drive in the rear of the shopping center (Defend-
ants' Exhibit I). 
From appellants' Exhibit C, it appeared that the 
Roy Shopping Center, a corporation, issued a war-
ranty deed to the respondents covering their property 
"together with a right of way in the grantees, their 
heirs, administrators, executors, successors, assigns and 
tenants and their or any of their customers, employees 
and visitors to the perpetual use in common with others 
entitled to the similar use of the streets, service drives, 
sidewalks and parking areas now or hereinafter con-
structed or set apart for any such use within the area 
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described * * *" The conveyance of the right of way 
was not made by the appellant but by the predecessors 
in interest of the appellant. The warranty deed was 
given in exchange for the transfer of property by the 
respondents to the predecessors in interest of the appel-
lant for the purposes of constructing and developing 
the shopping center ( T-40) . As a result of the con-
veyances, the shopping center was constructed and 
the appellant became the holder of the interest pre-
viously held by the Roy Shopping Center, Inc. In the 
deposition of Anthony Brown, he indicated that he 
was aware of the construction on the right of way but 
took no other action to interfere with the construction 
other than the letter sent by counsel (Defendants' 
Exhibit 5, DT-11-13). He did indicate, however, that 
at one time he had verbally protested the construction 
to a manager of the appellant's center, Mr. "\Vade, 
(DT-11). 
Mr. Brown indicated in his deposition that he had 
always been able to rent to customers and tenants the 
space he held in the premises and that the premises 
were rented at the time of his deposition (DT-18-20). 
At the time of trial, Mr. Anthon E. Brown testi-
fied that he had operated a small grocery store on the 
shopping center land prior to the development of the 
center ( T-39). Mr. Brown indicated that after the 
Shopping Center was constructed, he leased the prop-
erty constituting his portion of the area and that at 
present he has three tenants (T-41). He indicated 
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that his major tenant was Bee-Gee's, which occupied 
approximately 5/6 of the total area of his portion of 
the Shopping Center ( T-42). In front of the imme-
diate shopping center area there is blacktopping, park-
ing stalls and lighting (See Defendants' Exhibit 6). 
This parking area is to the south or front of the build-
ings constituting the Shopping Center and on the 
west of the buildings. Prior to the construction of 
the building by appellant, now occupied by Ford Fi-
nance, the area of the easement of the respondents 
was an area available for parking. There was black-
topping and parking stalls in the 92.8 foot area con-
stituting the parking easement of the respondents 
( T-44). The buildings of Mr. Brown were approxi-
mately 100 feet away from the 92.8 foot area consti-
tuting his parking easement (T-44). The building 
encroaching upon the easement was constructed in 
1963 (T-44). No objection other than the letter sent 
over a year prior to the time of construction and the 
verbal opposition indicated to Mr. Wade prior to con-
struction was ever taken by the respondents to prevent 
the construction of the building ( T-45-47) . 
Mr. Brown testified that there has been a constant 
increase in business and auto traffic at the Shopping 
Center ( T-48). He further indicated that the con-
struction of the building shut off circulation of the 
traffic in the area around the buildings which had pre-
viously circulated by virtue of the 30 foot space to 
the rear of the buildings. He indicated that this de-
creased the par king available to the tenants ( T -51 ) . 
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It appeared that at the time the agreement was entered 
into between appellant's predecessors and Mr. Brown 
for the construction and operation of the Shopping 
Center, the property of Mr. Brown was listed in the 
contract for valuation purposes at $110,000. Mr. Brown 
admitted that there was a barricade up around the 
property where the building was constructed for ap-
proximately three months before construction actually 
occurred ( T-65) . The building on the right of way 
was completed in the fall of 1963 ( T-72) . 
Mr. Edmond D. Cook, a real estate appraiser and 
consultant, testified that he valued the property of 
Mr. Brown at $91,128 prior to the construction of the 
building on the right of way and that after he appraised 
the property at $83,857, making a difference of $7,271 
( T-82). He indicated that he was not aware that the 
property had been previously valued at the time of 
the agreement to construct the Shopping Center at 
$110,000 (T-84). He made no study as to the number 
of cars in the area (T-92) and limited his appraisal 
on the effect of parking to parking stalls within 300 
feet of Mr. Brown's property (T-95). 
Mr. Glen H. Beck, a co-owner of Bee-Gee Ap· 
parel, a tenant in the property of the respondents, 
testified that he had no complaints as to the availability 
of parking and felt that additional buildings would 
generally strengthen the drawing power of the Center 
(T-100) . 
. Mr. Lester H. ~Tade, a shopping center developer 
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and former manager for appellant, indicated that he 
received no complaints from the respondents during 
the time that the barricade was around the property 
upon which the building was constructed. He stated 
that the construction of the building had greatly im-
proved access on the 30 foot area to the rear of the 
Shopping Center buildings by avoiding illegal parking 
problems that had been in existence in the past (T-
lll). Mr. Wade indicated that a 2.75 to 1 parking 
space to lease space ratio was desirable for a shopping 
center which would, in comparison to the area owned 
by Mr. Brown, be adequate (T-112). Mr. Wade, an 
experienced shopping center developer, was of the 
opinion that the value of the Brown property had not 
depreciated over the years, but had in fact increased 
m value by approximately $10,000 (T-112). 
Mr. Don P. Williams, an officer of the appellant 
corporation, indicated that there was no inadequacy 
of parking in the shopping center area and that the 
only time he had seen any parking difficulties was 
during a special Christmas promotion when a large 
part of the shopping center parking area had to be 
roped off to allow a Santa Claus to come in on a heli-
copter (T-125). 
Subsequent to the presentation of the evidence, 
the court indicated that it would be inequitable to com-
pel removal of the building but found that there had 
been an intentional and deliberate effort on the part 
of the appellant to take advantage of the respondents 
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and awarded $3,000 as the depreciation to the total 
property for the "intentional depriving" of the re-
spondents of the west end of the parking area. No 
evidence of any kind was offered by either party to 
indicate that there had been a depreciation of the prop· 
erty in a value of $3,000. No witness appraised the 
loss of the easement at $3,000 or even anywhere near 
that figure. 
Based upon the above facts, it is submitted that 
this court should reverse. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN A':VARD· 
ING THE RESPONDENTS $3,000 FOR DAM-
AGE TO THEIR PROPERTY BY VIRTUE OF 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A BUILDING UP-
ON A RIGHT OF WAY AT THE ROY SHOP· 
PING CENTER SINCE (A) RESPONDENTS 
WERE GUILTY OF LACHES, (B) THE EVI· 
DENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW ANY 
ACTUAL DAMAGE TO THE RESPOND· 
ENTS. 
A 
It is well settled that before a party can claim 
damages or equitable relief because of an interference 
with an easement, it must appear that he acted promptly 
10 
in seeking some relief or protecting his right of way 
position. Thus, in 28 C.J.S .. , Easements, § 108, it is 
stated: 
"A party seeking equitable relief against in-
terference with ap., easement must be prompt in 
doing so. Any long delay not satisfactorily ex-
plained nor accounted for will bar his rights to 
such relief * * * " 
It is recognized that mere delay in and of itself 
is not necesarily the essential element for the applica-
tion of the doctrine of laches. Jones Mining Co. v. 
Cardiff Mining & Milling Co., 56 Utah 449, 191 P. 
426 ( 1920) ; Pierce v. King County, 62 Wash. 2d 324, 
382 P.2d 628 (1963). Rather it is the prejudice which 
arises from the apparent acquiescence of a party in the 
conduct of another party. 
Thus in Lehi Irr. Co. v. Moyle, 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 
867 ( 1886), it was held that a party could not stand 
by and watch settlers use land and increase the capacity 
of an irrigation ditch and thereafter deny the power 
of the persons to use the ditch. 
In Mary Jane Stevens v. First National Building 
Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P.2d 1099 (1936), this Court 
indicated that a party could not stand by and watch a 
change take place and thereafter claim a remedy for 
an injury allegedly sustained as the result of the action. 
In Ruthrau,ff v. Silver King Western Mining & 
1llilling Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 P.2d 388 (1938), the 
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Court acknowledged that equity would not aid stale 
demands nor act without showing of conscience, good 
faith and reasonable diligence. Certainly, under the 
facts and situation presented in the instant case, the 
doctrine of laches should be available to the appellant 
as a defense to any claim on the part of the respondents 
for damages arising out of the construction of the 
building on their right of way in the Roy Shopping 
Center. 
The facts in this case disclose that a conversation 
was apparently had with the respondent Anthon E. 
Brown relating to the construction of a building on 
the right of way. Mr. Brown merely protested the 
proposed construction through a letter from his attor· 
ney (Defendants' Exhibit 5) in November of 1961. 
The principal basis upon which the construction was 
opposed was the contention that the building to be 
constructed would compete with the building which the 
respondents were presently leasing. Thereafter, no 
further protestations or efforts to manifest objection 
to the construction of the proposed right of way were 
taken. Construction was not completed until fall of 
1963. Further, prior to the time construction was ac· 
tually commenced in 1963, the area was barricaded 
and set apart for construction. The respondents had 
actual knowledge of the construction and the intention 
of the appellant to undertake construction. They were 
aware of the fact that the parking easement would 
no longer be available for their patrons since it was 
not available during the full time of construction. 
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\Vith all this knowledge and with the fact that the 
construction to be made was known to the respondents, 
they stood by and took no action. Construction was 
completed, the building rented, the Shopping Center 
improved and still no action was taken. Only when 
the appellant brought suit against the respondents 
for breach of a lease did the respondents make any 
claim for damages arising out of the alleged encroach-
ment on their right of way. In the meantime, the 
appellant had been allowed to go forward with con-
struction, the use of the building, the development of 
the Shopping Center, all under the apparent impres-
sion that the respondents had acquiesced in the con-
struction period. 
The respondents' tenant testified that he was not 
opposed to the construction because he felt that any 
development of the Center would work to the benefit 
of all concerned ( T-100) . Certainly, it is not equitable 
nor proper to allow the respondents damages at this 
late date where they stood by and watched the con-
struction acquiesced in the apparent use of the building 
and only when called to account for their own breach 
of covenant did they offer any objection to the con-
struction. Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National 
Building Co., supra. Certainly under these circum-
stances, the doctrine of laches should bar the claim of 
the respondents for damages. It is certainly inequitable 
to allow a party to sit back and watch another party 
act to his apparent prejudi~e and detriment and in so 
doing mislead the party into a belief that the action 
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he is taking is proper and consented to and then there-
after at a later date be subjected to a suit for damages. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the 
respondents' judgment should have been denied on 
the grounds of laches. 
B 
It is admitted that the record is clear that the 
respondents had a right of way in the property adjacent 
to the east end of the Roy Shopping Center. It is 
further admitted that the appellant caused to be con· 
structed upon that right of way a building. It is sub· 
mitted, however, that the trial court erred in finding 
that the respondents had been damaged in the sum of 
$3,000 by the construction of the building. No testi-
mony was offered which would fix the respondents' 
damages at $3,000. .M:r. Lester 'V' ade, a shopping 
center developer, testified that the construction of the 
new building did solve certain parking problems that 
had existed with reference to a 30 foot strip of right 
of way to the rear of the buildings and indicated that 
the property of the respondents had increased in value 
as a result of the development of the shopping center 
by approximately $10,000 over what the property was 
at the time they received it. The co-owner of the largest 
tenant of the respondents testified that in his opinion 
there was no damage from the constructin because he 
was of the opinion that the more commercial develop-
ment that occurred at the Shopping Center, the more 
benefit it would work to the Center as a whole ( T-100). 
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.l\fr. Anthon Brown's testimony was to the effect that 
the only impact from the construction of the building 
was the loss of parking space. However, the parking 
otherwise appeared to be adequate except on one 
occasion during Christmas time when a portion of the 
parking center was roped off for a special Christmas 
promotional event. There was no direct proof of any 
kind offered that as a result of the construction, Mr. 
Brown lost clients or that his tenants lost patrons or 
that he lost any business income during the period. 
Indeed, it appeared as a result of the total development 
of the Shopping Center business was increased in the 
area. The sole testimony as to any damage to the 
respondents was based upon respondents' expert, Mr. 
Cook, who testified that the respondents' property had 
a lost market value because of the loss of the parking 
right of way. However, this figure was substantially 
unrelated to the figure that the court imposed judgment 
upon. 
It is recognized that in determining the damages 
arising from an encroachment upon a right of way, 
the usual rule is ~at the difference between the value 
of the property just before the encroachment and its 
value immediately after obstruction is completed is 
to be the amount to which the party should be com-
pensated. Ross v. American Security & Fidelity Co., 
123 Cal. App. 133, 10 P.2d 1019 (1932); McCormick, 
Damages, 532 to 534 (1935). However, Rule 52 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the 
court "find the facts specially and state separately its 
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conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of an 
appropriate judgment." In the instant case, it is 
apparent that the trial court apparently misapplied 
the standard required by Rule 52 since the findings do 
not definitely state anything more than that the re-
spondents are entitled to judgment against the appel-
lant in the sum of $3,000 for depreciation to their 
property. There is no finding of a market value prior 
to the time the building was constructed on the respond-
ents' right of way and a subsequent value. Further, 
it is apparent from the Court's comments rendered at 
the end of the trial that the judgment for $3,000 was 
not based upon any actual loss to the respondents but , 
based upon what the court felt the respondents should 
receive because of an intentional encroachment upon 
their property. Thus, the damage issue was not properly 
considered by the court. 
It is submitted that the evidence is wholly insuffi-
cient to sustain the court's judgment. The rounded ' 
figure of $3,000 relates in no manner to the situation 
that existed at the Roy Shopping Center at the time 
of the construction of the building. The evidence, as 
noted in the Statement of Facts and in the discussion, 
shows that there was no actual loss to the respondents. 
Consequently, since the court apparently misapplied 
the standard of damages and further since there is no 
evidence of record to in any way indicate that respond· 
ents should be compensated in the sum of $3,000, it 
is submitted that the decision of the trial court should 
be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that this court should reverse the 
decision of the trial court on two definite grounds. 
First, it is submitted that the evidence clearly discloses 
that the respondents stood by with full knowledge and 
allowed the appellant to construct a building on their 
right of way and did so under circumstances that worked 
to the absolute prejudice of the appellant in face of 
respondents' present claim. Further, it appears that 
respondents completely acquiesced in the construction. 
Only a minor protest was raised to any proposed 
construction on the respondents' right of way and 
then only because of a possible competing commercial 
establishment would use the premises. Further the 
protests were long before the time of construction 
actually occurred and a substantial period of time 
passed during which the appellant had barricaded the 
property for the purposes of construction and during 
which time the building was constructed without any 
objection being raised by the respondents. Only when 
the appellant brought suit for breach of lease covenant 
to pay rent did the respondents for the first time urge 
that the construction of the building had in any way 
deprived him of a serious right. It is apparent, there-
fore, that the respondents have been guilty of laches 
and that the judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed. 
Additionally, it appears that the trial court entered 
an arbitrary figure for damages in favor of the respond-
17 
ents. The figure was in no way related to the evidenct 
offered by either party and cannot be rationalized upo11 
the record. Further, it appears that the court in enter· 
ing the judgment did so on an unsound legal basis. II 
does not appear that the court actually considered the 
before and after values to the repsondents' property 
by virtue of the construction of the building. It i~ 
submitted that consequently this Court should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'VILLIAM J. CA YIAS, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
405 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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